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Abstract
Responsible alcohol service programmes have evolved in many countries alongside a general increase
in the availability of alcohol and a greater focus on the prevention of alcohol-related road crashes.
They also recognize the reality that a great deal of high-risk drinking and preventable harm occurs
in and around licensed premises or as drinkers make their way home. Early US efficacy studies of
programmes which trained managers and barstaff to limit customers  ̃ levels of intoxication and
prevent drink driving showed promise. Studies of effectiveness of these programmes in the wider
community, and in the absence of the enforcement of liquor laws, found little benefit. The data will
be interpreted as suggesting that, in reality, skills deficits in the serving of alcohol are not a significant
problem compared with the motivational issue for a commercial operation of abiding by laws that are
rarely enforced and which are perceived as risking the goodwill of their best customers. Australian,
UK and US experiences with liquor law enforcement by police will be discussed along with outcomes
from the Australian invention of Alcohol Accords, informal agreements between police, licensees
and local councils to trade responsibly. It will be concluded that the major task involved in lifting
standards of service and preventing harm is to institutionalize legal and regulatory procedures which
impact most on licensed premises. A number of strategies are suggested also for creating a political
and social climate which supports the responsible service of alcohol and thereby supports the
enactment and enforcement of appropriate liquor laws. [Stockwell T. Responsible alcohol service: lessons
from evaluations of server training and policing initiatives. Drug Alcohol Rev 1001; 20:257265]
Key words: responsible beverage service, alcohol, licensed premises, law enforcement, self-regulation, BAC,
drink-driving, violence
Introduction
Like many social movements, Responsible Beverage
Service (RBS) began in North America with the first
published evaluations concerning programmes initiated
in California [1] and Ontario [2]. These early pro-
grammes had a predominant focus on the prevention of
drinking and driving, mainly through training barstaff
and their managers to limit levels of intoxication
attained by their customers. Mainly North American
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research reviewed by O D̃onnell [3] suggested that
approximately 50% of alcohol-related crashes involve
the prior consumption of alcohol on licensed premises,
making them a logical focus for prevention.
Another trigger for the growth of RBS during the
1980s and 1990s was the rapid rise in civil actions
brought against North American licensees on whose
premises drivers were served to dangerous levels of
intoxication before driving and seriously injuring a
third party [4]. Some of these lawsuits involved the
payment of millions of dollars to the injured parties,
principally on the basis that the licensed establishment
had in fact broken the law by serving a patron until
they achieved a state of obvious intoxication. Liquor
laws in almost all North American jurisdictions make
it an offence to serve alcohol to an already intoxicated
customer. Civil cases have also established a legal
principle of negligence in such cases and —vicarious
liability  ̃ for the actions of customers even after they
have left the premises [4]. The drafting of model
—Dram Shop  ̃ laws which clarify and codify such
vicarious liability was also a direct trigger for RBS
programmes since they also identified acceptable
defences against legal action– principally by provid-
ing evidence that everything possible was done to
prevent such incidents occurring by, for example,
appropriate training of staff [5].
Legal liability for licensees has been far more
limited in other English-speaking countries [6]. In
Australia, for example, there is a state-run victim s̃
compensation scheme for people injured in road
crashes and hence it has not usually been necessary to
resort to civil action to gain compensation, although
there have been a few cases involving relatively small
sums of money [4]. It is arguable that the process of
deregulation of the licensed drinking environment in
terms of trading hours, controls on outlet density and
age of drinking in many non-US developed coun-
tries [7] has also contributed to an interest in RBS and
related strategies. What other avenues are open to
concerned citizens for the control of local alcohol-
related problems when there is 24-hour trading and
reluctance among regulators to either refuse or cancel
liquor licences? It may be useful to view the RBS
movement within this framework, certainly in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, where Host Responsibility
(incorporating licensed and unlicensed establishments)
and mandated server training are becoming wide-
spread: regardless of the time and place where alcohol
is served, RBS seeks to ensure intoxication and hence
alcohol-related harm is minimized.
This paper will consider evidence for the poten-
tial effectiveness of RBS and also various law
enforcement initiatives. It will then address the more
important issue of how to create a legislative,
regulatory and socio-political environment within
which alcohol is served and consumed with lowered
risk of harm. A parallel development to RBS has
been the development of policing strategies designed
to limited public disorder generally and alcohol-
related violence in particular. A number of studies
from around the world have documented the strong
association between public violence and drinking on
licensed premises (e.g. [8]). In Western Australia,
Chikritzhs et al. [9] report a peak in violence in and
around licensed premises at closing time which
shifts when closing times alter and increase in
frequency when alcohol purchases are elevated by
longer trading hours. There is now a strong con-
sensus in the literature that the association between
drinking, violence and licensed premises can be
attributed directly to intoxication increasing the risk
of violence in a number of social situations which
are already conducive to conflict and frustra-
tion [10,11]. The evidence for the potential benefits
of police enforcement strategies to reduce public
order problems as well as more informal strategies
designed to facilitate self-regulation by licensees with
the assistance and encouragement of police and
concerned citizens will also be discussed. The range
of serious problems associated with drinking on
licensed premises and the range of agencies with the
potential to intervene effectively demands that to be
fully effective RBS needs to be conceptualized as
part of a comprehensive range of local prevention
and policy measures.
Can RBS programmes achieve their goals?
Early studies of RBS simply sought to establish
whether such programmes could limit intoxication
under optimal conditions. A classic example was the
Navy Server Study conducted by Saltz [1], in which
two similar US Navy social clubs participated, one
as the intervention site and the other as a control.
High-level support was accorded the project, the
club manager in the intervention site was persuaded
to introduce a number of changes to club policies
and serving staff received a total of 18 hours of
training, including a focus on practical skills for
detecting intoxication, slowing down service and
service refusal if required. Policy changes introduced
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included not serving beer in large —pitchers ,̃ making
food more available and having staff systematically
monitor alcohol consumption in every area of the
bar. Customers  ̃ self-reported alcohol consumption as
well as direct observations of their drinking were
used to estimate the proportions who would have
achieved a BAC of 0.10%. There was a significant
reduction of this proportion in the intervention site
from 33% to 15% with little change at the control
site.
Russ & Geller [12] employed a different design
when evaluating the Training in Intervention Proce-
dures by Servers of Alcohol (TIPS) programme in
two fully co-operative commercial bars. Approximately
half of the staff in both establishments attended and
passed a 6-hour training course with similar objectives
to the Navy Server Study. Research assistants posed as
customers and attempted to purchase a drink every 20
minutes for 2 hours. Outcome measures were the
responses of bar staff and the BACs attained by these
—pseudo-patrons .̃ It was found that trained staff
intervened to slow or stop consumption on average
3.24 times per pseudo-patron performance compared
with only 0.75 times for untrained staff. Furthermore,
the BACs attained by patrons served by trained staff
was significantly lower (0.059%) than those served by
untrained staff (0.103%).
A later Canadian study conducted by Gliksman and
colleagues in Thunder Bay, Ontario extended server
training to four commercial establishments and used
four control sites [2]. A modest but significant change
in server behaviour towards RBS ideals was demon-
strated in the intervention sites.
From these promising beginnings, RBS pro-
grammes progressed towards larger effectiveness
involving many more sites and training of hundreds
of barstaff. Sadly, the early promise of the first
demonstration projects was not realised in studies
reported from the United States and Western
Australia.
In one of the largest studies recorded to date,
McKnight [13] evaluated the impact of RBS training
of 6 hours for managers and 3 hours to barstaff across
100 premises in eight US cities against 135 control
establishments. A total of 1079 staff were trained.
Pseudo-patrons were employed to feign signs of
intoxication on entry to each establishment and
recorded whether or not they were refused service– a
demanding criterion. It was found that there was a
small increase in other forms of RBS intervention
(offering non-alcoholic alternatives, slowing service)
from 14% to 27%, but that outright service refusal
remained very low at 5%.
At the other side of the world, Lang et al. [14]
reported on a smaller community-wide intervention
study in the port city of Fremantle, Western Aus-
tralia. Over 130 bar staff were trained in seven of
the larger licensed premises which had been found
to be responsible for over 70% of incidents of harm
(assaults and drink-driving offences) associated with
premises in that area. A neighbouring entertainment
area was used as a control with seven matched
establishments and no interventions. Both police
personnel and a trainer selected by the local retail
trade association were involved in service delivery.
Managers were encouraged to develop responsible
house policies covering 11 key areas (serving under-
age and intoxicated, safe transport home, preventing
violence, providing non-alcoholic alternatives, etc.).
While there were significant changes in the knowl-
edge of responsible service issues among barstaff
who attended the course and a significant reduction
in the number of patrons exiting premises with
BACs above 0.08, there were no changes in rates of
service refusal to —drunk  ̃ pseudo-patrons or an
increase in appropriate age-ID checking and only
minimal changes overall in the implementation of
responsible House Policies by participating venues.
One notable exception was of a high-profile hotel
(Australian term for a large bar, tavern or —pub )̃
which introduced a range of new policies, refused
service to drunk pseudo-patrons, had no patrons
exiting with BACs in excess of 0.15 and reported
increased profits.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from
these American and Australian experiences. The
first is that when RBS training is applied at a
community-wide level, the promising impact meas-
ured in the demonstration projects is diluted. The
extent to which this is due to the absence of
favourable selection factors in the smaller demon-
stration studies as opposed to shorter training is
unclear. At least some of this dilution appears to be
associated with a failure to whole-heartedly imple-
ment the principles of RBS. It works well where
there is strong back-up from management but this
cannot be guaranteed by any means on a purely
voluntary basis.
Another approach to the issue of compliance with
RBS principles is one of the enforcement of existing
liquor laws, whether by police or civilian licensing
inspectors.
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A comparison of RBS and law enforcement
approaches
In many countries liquor laws include clear legal
requirements that alcohol is not served to drunk or
under-age people. The former of these provisions in
particular (serving drunk people) is in the main hardly
enforced in many jurisdictions, partly because of
difficulties of defining what constitutes —intoxication  ̃or
drunkenness and partly because of low priority
accorded by police and/or licensing authorities to this
issue [e.g. 15].
There have been some documented attempts to
formalize the role of police in relation to RBS by
having an active and explicit enforcement programme.
Two classic examples will be outlined which permit a
direct comparison between law enforcement and a
voluntary approach involving training staff in RBS
principles.
In the late 1980s Dr James McKnight, President of
the National Public Services Research Institute,
Maryland, USA approached police chiefs from over
100 US jurisdictions seeking expressions of interest in
evaluating a law enforcement approach to responsible
alcohol service. Eight expressed willingness to partici-
pate and Michigan was eventually selected as a
demonstration site enabling a comparison with the
results of the server training study conducted there a
few years earlier. The enforcement programme
involved plain-clothes police visiting premises in order
to check for intoxicated customers and to observe
serving practices [16]. Prior to this phase there was
prior notification to all licensees in the intervention
area backed up by local media attention on the
programme. Licensees were provided with a training
video and table-top cards showing signs of intoxication
and advice about legal penalties on serving staff and
licensees for service to intoxicated patrons. Following
the plain-clothes visits, feedback was given to licensees
ranging from praise for good practice, through
suggestions for improvement, to warnings and, ulti-
mately, a fine. There were substantial increase in
refusal of service to intoxicated patrons which was
most pronounced when the programme was first
launched and only warnings of pending enforcement
were given: refusal rates increased to 54.3% of
purchase attempts compared to only 16% following the
earlier RBS training programme [13]. The evaluation
also examined the incidence of alcohol-related road
crashes involving people who had been drinking on
licensed premises and found that these had sig-
nificantly reduced following the introduction of the
programme. It was estimated that for every dollar
spent on this particular enforcement programme,
between $90US and $280US was saved on the costs of
road crashes.
A more direct and well-controlled comparison of
training versus enforcement was reported by
Grube [17] as part of the Community Trials Project, a
large multi-site community intervention project to
reduce alcohol-related harm conducted in Califor-
nia [18]. Grube reports on one specific focus of this
major project– access to alcohol in liquor stores by
under-age drinkers. In all over 479 liquor stores across
6 communities were included in the study. Three
communities were intervention sites and three were
control sites. The intervention sites received training of
liquor store staff only, a police enforcement pro-
gramme only or both interventions at the same time.
The law enforcement intervention involved firstly
letters advising owners of a new enforcement pro-
gramme followed by a —decoy  ̃operation in which the
police had under-age drinkers attempt to purchase
alcohol. Stores selling to the decoys were fined. Prior
to intervention approximately 50% of attempts by
under-age drinkers to purchase alcohol were success-
ful. There were significant reductions in proportions of
stores willing to sell to under-age drinkers following
the intervention, with rates of less than 20% where the
police enforcement programme was used. The pres-
ence of training made no significant additional impact
over and above the enforcement programme.
Taken together, these studies tell a similar and,
perhaps, unsurprising story: a determined law enforce-
ment approach in which penalties are applied to
licensees breaking the law has a far more significant
impact on the responsible service of alcohol at a
community-wide level than does RBS training alone.
It might seem that elaborate training programmes are
unlikely to modify serving practices across many
licensed premises and whole communities and that
failure to adopt RBS practices is more a problem of
motivation than of knowledge and skill.
Before RBS training is dismissed altogether as
unnecessary, one interesting study with a more hopeful
outcome should be mentioned. Holder & Wage-
naar [19] utilized 12 years of road-crash data for the
entire United States to analyse the impact of the
introduction of mandatory RBS training in the state of
Oregon in 1986. The outcome measure was the
surrogate measure of single-vehicle night-time crashes
for alcohol-related crashes: these have been shown to
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involve prior consumption of alcohol in up to 80% of
cases [20]. Despite the fact that the training was
phased in over 2 years, there was an immediate and
significant reduction in single-vehicle night-time cra-
shes in Oregon compared with the rest of the United
States after the law was passed. The reduction was
sustained for the 18-month —after  ̃ period of the
study.
Why should the passing of a law requiring
compulsory RBS training succeed where other large-
scale training programmes have failed? And why
should the effect have been immediate? A plausible
explanation is that law enforcement methods succeed
to the extent that they deter law-breaking through
publicizing the penalties. Homel [21] has described
how deterrence operates in relation to the prevention of
drinking and driving: an optimal outcome is not
achieved be law enforcement alone unless it is highly
visible and well-publicized. Thus random breath-
testing is most effective when large, highly visible
mobile testing units are employed backed-up with a
vigorous media campaign. A related example in the
liquor service area is the demonstration by Wagenaar
& Holder [22] of reduced alcohol-related road cra-
shes following highly publicized cases in which
licensees have been sued successfully for millions of
dollars when a drunk patron injures or kills a third
party in a road crash.
In conclusion, in order to off-set the commercial
imperative to sell alcohol to customers on demand,
disincentives to serve alcohol to drunk and under-age
customers can be created which are more effective than
exhorting staff and managers to serve alcohol responsi-
bly through the medium of RBS training. Such
disincentives are most effective when they combine a
targeted enforcement programme with general deter-
rence created by direct warnings and general publicity
for the programme.
Other law enforcement approaches focusing
public order problems in and around licensed
premises
Two other approaches to law enforcement and licensed
premises will be discussed: the use of uniformed
patrols of premises at high risk times and the
negotiation of local accords between police, licensees
and a local community.
The classic study in the area of community policing
of pubs was conducted by Jeffs & Saunders [23] at a
seaside resort in the south-west of England. During
the summer months this resort was a popular
destination for large groups of young people from
other parts of the country and a public order problem
was apparent around the local entertainment descri-
bed, where there were many clubs and pubs. A
community policing intervention was developed
involving the used of uniformed police visiting all
licensed premises in pairs two or three times per week.
The officers on patrol would initiate friendly contact
with the managers and be seen to make a thorough
check for under-age and/or drunk customers. Jeffs &
Saunders (1983) report there was a 20% reduction in
public order offences which reverted to baseline when
the intervention was discontinued. In addition there
was no such reduction in a control town, which was
also a seaside resort of similar size.
There have been a number of attempts to replicate
the above studies, although few have been documented
formally and published. One exception was a study
reported by Burns et al. [24] in Sydney, Australia. In
this exercise, uniformed police patrols visited licensed
premises at high-risk times on over 1200 occasions in
a popular entertainment area. Unlike the English
study, no specific instructions were given to check for
under-age or intoxicated customers. Rather, the philos-
ophy appeared to be about preventing trouble-makers
getting out of hand by creating a more visible police
presence. At face value the results were disappointing.
There was actually a significant increase in reported
violent incidents although a slight decrease in local
emergency department admissions in the intervention
area. No measures of server behaviour or patron
intoxication were employed.
These last findings are usefully seen in conjunction
with a study conducted in Rhode Island, New York
State, United States in which a broad-spectrum
community intervention project to reduce alcohol-
related injuries included a liquor law enforcement
component [25]. It was reported that arrests for
assaults increased by 20% in the intervention site but
that presentations of assault injuries to the local
emergency room decreased by 25%. These results are
not as paradoxical as might first appear. It is well
established that only a small proportion of assaults in
public places are reported to the police [11]. An
increased police presence inevitably creates more
opportunities for such assaults to be observed and
reported in official statistics. This need not be
inconsistent in any way with an actual decline in




In the 1990s a new model of regulating licensed
premises emerged in Australia that came to be known
the Accord. The idea emerged from the pioneering
work of Ross Homel and colleagues[26] in the prime
tourist area of Surfer s̃ Paradise on the Queensland
coast and also the earlier work of the West End Forum
in Melbourne [27]. A project known as the Surfer s̃
Safety Action Project was established in response to
adverse media coverage of high rates of public
drunkenness and alcohol-related violence concentrated
in an entertainment area with over 20 nightclubs in
close proximity to each other. A partnership was
established between licensees, police, council officers
and community representatives to create a safer
environment and a less tarnished reputation for the
area. A Code of Practice was drawn up and signed by
all licensees to agree to limit high-risk promotional and
sales practices such as discounting drinks, gimmicks to
encourage fast or excessive intake and serving under-
age and intoxicated customers. Training of security
staff to handle conflict by non-violent means and of
bar staff in responsible service practices was also
introduced, while licensees were encouraged to
develop management policies to discourage intoxica-
tion and disorderly behaviour. Maintaining the agree-
ment was in the commercial interests of participants,
since the ban on discounting was in effect a price-
fixing agreement. Venues that broke rank were
—grassed oñ  to a Best Practices committee over-
sighting the project and shamed into falling into line.
An energetic evaluation team also closely monitored
compliance and gave ongoing feedback to the commit-
tee. Within the first 6 months of the project there were
significant improvements measured by a House Policy
Checklist [28] in house policies and serving practices
and a halving of violent incidents observed by
researchers from 9.8 to 4.7 per 100 hours of
observation. Unfortunately, at a 2-year follow-up this
improvement had been lost and measures had returned
to baseline.
The above approach has applied to innumerable
local areas in Australia under the name of alcohol or
licensing Accords. Two other evaluations have been
conducted which have shown variously mixed [29]
and weak outcomes [30]. It is evident that these
Accords have taken different forms in different places
according to local priorities but also the preparedness
of police to tackle difficult issues such as service to
intoxication. The evaluation of the Fremantle Accord
found an increase in assault offences occurring in
public places, which is likely to reflect the greater
probability of detection afforded by a greater police
presence as well as police sometimes being involved in
assaults themselves [30]. The evaluation of the Gee-
long Accord in Victoria reported a halving of the rate
of all assault offences but no control area was utilized
and nor was any differentiation presented between
assaults in public and private places, at daytime and
night-time, in and around licensed premises or
elsewhere and it is difficult to assess the claimed
outcome [29]. An interesting feature of the Geelong
Accord was the reported preparedness of the police to
get tough on any non-compliant licensee by more
regular visits and the issuing of fines for any observed
minor infringement, e.g. not displaying the name of
the licensee clearly at the entrance.
There can be no doubt that the Accord approach
can be an effective harm-reduction strategy, at least in
the short term and when there is an energetic
monitoring presence. Interesting issues are raised
regarding the legality of what are effectively price-
fixing agreements. Another important issue is the
extent to which the approach encourages or dis-
courages police and licensing authorities to focus on
the —difficult  ̃matters of service to intoxication and to
under-age drinkers– or whether the alliance forged
becomes a —gentlemen s̃ agreement  ̃ to turn a blind
eye.
Institutionalizing Responsible Beverage Service
A number of potentially effective strategies have been
described to encourage responsible service of alcohol
on licensed premises and which have demonstrable
impact on public health, safety and order outcomes.
Failures of such strategies have occurred as a
consequence of less than whole-hearted implementa-
tion or failure to sustain the effort of implementation
over the longer term. Difficulties of recruiting police
departments to participate in licensing law enforce-
ment were described in the United States by
McKnight; the Torquay policing experiment in Eng-
land and Surfer s̃ Paradise project in Australia
demonstrated major short-term benefits in the reduc-
tion of alcohol-related violence; server training pro-
grammes in the United States and Australia were
effective when management were totally supportive but
the effectiveness was dissipated when training was
provided to a wide cross-section of premises in a
particular area. The energy to implement and sustain
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such interventions can come from many sources: from
the research community, from local community con-
cerns, from rival licensees, from the police, from
managers of venues and from adverse media coverage.
How can all these forces be harnessed to avoid the
situation that effective interventions are only intro-
duced when things become very bad and when local
community leaders are able to devote time and
resources into implementing strategies that just hap-
pen to be effective? What can be done to sustain
consistent and concerted prevention efforts? This
discussion and review closes with a series of sugges-
tions, summarized in Table 1, for institutionalizing
RBS. These recommendations are made on the basis
of both the author s̃ interpretation of the available
evaluation literature and of his experiences observing
licensing and RBS interventions in practice.
It will be apparent that there are many players with
an interest in how licensed premises perform and
operate variously from the business community,
government and non-government agencies. Commu-
nity action projects frequently seek to achieve health
and safety outcomes through negotiation, mutual
agreement and co-operation. When such projects are
evaluated against objective criteria and found to be
wanting, there is an opportunity for community
decision-makers to consider more formal changes in
how local licensed premises are regulated and even
whether local, state or provincial laws are in need of
reform. Such was the experience of the Fremantle
Respects You Project [14,28] when the steering
committee was presented with hard data suggesting
minimal impact of a server training programme and a
series of recommendations for regulatory and legal
reform. These recommendations were debated by the
committee before the evaluation report was finalized.
Since the membership included senior health, liquor
licensing and police officials as well as the head of the
state retailers  ̃association, once agreement was reached
and documented, an unstoppable momentum for law
reform was created. While continued submissions and
representations were required over almost 4 years,
many significant reforms of the Western Australian
Liquor Act were introduced by an amendment bill,
several of which were first recommended by the
consensus statement in the above evaluation report.
For the first time there was a statement that a primary
object of the Act was the minimization of alcohol-
related harm; a concise and useful definition of what
constituted —intoxication  ̃ was provided and the com-
pulsory training of licensees and managers in RBS
practices was introduced. Other strategies outside of
Table 1. Recommendations for institutionalizing RBS in legal, regulatory and socio-political structures
Legal structures Regulatory structures
Promoting supportive socio-political
environment
Well-drafted legislation with clear
harm minimization objective
Harm minimization as the major
corporate goal of licensing
authorities
Public health advocacy on alcohol
and licensing issues
Mandatory server training Plain-clothes licensing inspectors Publicly disseminated data on harm
and licensed premises
Banning of irresponsible promotions Uniformed police presence Media campaigns promoting
licensing laws
Local controls over trading hours
and conditions
Comprehensive training of licensing
officers and police
Local licensing forums with
community participation
Dram Shop Laws, i.e. laws which
define legal responsibilities of
licensees for behaviour of patrons
after they leave the premises
Graded system of penalties leading
to temporary licence suspension
Incentives for good practice by
licensees
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the Act were also introduced such as the development
of a host responsibility public education campaign to
support licensees and party hosts in RBS. It should be
stressed that these successes would not have occurred
without energetic lobbying by the Alcohol Advisory
Council of Western Australia throughout the legal
review and amendment process.
A liquor licensing act which promotes RBS and
empowers police, licensing authorities and local com-
munities to take effective local action is one thing,
but having that act utilized and enforced is quite
another. Table 1 identifies the importance of having
the corporate objectives of relevant authorities
embracing the principles of RBS and having their
staff thoroughly trained in a wide-range of commu-
nity monitoring and enforcement strategies. It has
been discussed in more detail elsewhere how reg-
ulatory structures can be created which are capable of
effecting genuine deterrence against irresponsible
promotions and management practices [e.g. 15,31].
For example, a graded system of penalties ranging
from warnings, to modest fines, to temporary licence
suspensions of differing lengths, to outright loss of
licence is a highly desirable alternative to the situa-
tion in which the only available penalties are the
laying criminal charges leading to large fines and loss
of licence.
Even with a well-drafted liquor act with ample
harm minimization provisions backed up by a well-
organized system of regulation may be inadequate if
the host community is hostile or otherwise unsuppor-
tive. The support of the local community for such
measures can never be taken for granted and a number
of strategies are desirable to maintain a groundswell of
support and an appropriate level of concern about the
dangers of high-risk alcohol consumption. It is
strongly recommended that local and regional alcohol
advocacy groups are established to maintain publicity
and a presence on alcohol prevention and policy with
an emphasis on liquor licensing laws and their
enforcement as a principal prevention —lever [̃7].
Another helpful strategy is to maintain a regular flow
of data on local levels of alcohol related harm (or
regional or national), ideally with details regarding
harm associated with licensed premises, both in
particular and in general. Such data should be made
available to the general public when it is possible to do
this and, of course, to local decision-makers within the
legal and regulatory structures of liquor licensing. In
addition, prevention activity on the ground is maxi-
mally effective when supported by relevant and hard-
hitting media campaigns [e.g. 21]. All of these
strategies can combine to create and maintain a social
and political climate supportive of effective regulation
and enforcement of liquor laws.
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